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More than just a walk in the Park: a new view on recreational easements  
Judith Bray  
 
INTRODUCTION                     
                      In a country where interest in recreational sport is so high1 and can 
verge on the obsessional it is strange that there have been so few challenges to 
the principle that enjoyment of another’s land for sport or recreation cannot 
constitute an easement. This issue finally reached the Court of Appeal in 2017 
giving the Court a chance to review existing law and the legal status of sporting 
and recreational rights. In Regency Villas Title Ltd v Diamond Resorts (Europe) 
Ltd2 the owners of a number of flats and houses enjoyed as timeshare 
accommodation sought the right to use facilities in a neighbouring leisure 
centre and gardens. The rights claimed included the use of a swimming pool, a 
golf course, squash courts, tennis courts and a range of other facilities. If the 
Court of Appeal were to decide that such rights constituted easements then a 
major change would be made in the law.  
                           This article will consider the nature of recreational and sporting 
rights and the obstacles which have been put forward to the upholding such 
rights as easements. It will also explore the willingness of the courts to find 
new easements in the light of changing social conditions. It will look at the 
term ius spatiandi ‘the privilege of wandering at will over all and every part of 
another’s land’3 a right which has not traditionally been regarded as 
constituting as easement under English law. This rule has a long history which 
dates back to the Roman law of servitudes4 and which could have proved a 
major obstacle to the claimant’s case in Regency Villas. Finally, the article will 
                                                          
1 Figures from Sport England active lives survey 2016-2017 show that 60.7 per cent of adults (or 27 million) do at least 150 
minutes of activity [including fitness ,cycling, walking and all sports] per week, https://www.sportengland.org/news-and-
features/news/2017/january/26/active-lives-offers-fresh-insight/ 
2 [2017] EWCA Civ 238. 
3 See Evershed MR in Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 136; See also Farwell J in International Tea Stores Co v Hobbs 
[1903] 2 Ch 165 at 172. 
4 See re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 142 where Evershed MR refers to Real Property Law G R Y Radcliffe 2nd Ed 
(Oxford University Press 1938) as follows ‘This principle is well illustrated by the Roman jurist Paul when he says that you 
cannot have a servitude giving you the right to wander about and picnic in another’s land’. 
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reopen the question of whether an easement can be found where a positive 
obligation is placed on the servient owner. 
The characteristics of an easement 
                       As every law student knows the characteristics of an easement 
can be found in the case of re Ellenborough Park5 although it should be noted 
that in that case Danckwerts J in the High Court decision and later Evershed 
MR in the Court of Appeal had relied on the seventh edition of Cheshire the 
Law of Real Property as their primary source for these characteristics. The 
characteristics are not rules of law but merely starting points laying out the 
parameters which limit the courts in determining whether a right is an 
easement.  Although there were traditionally four key characteristics of an 
easement, several sublayers have been added over the years, each trying to 
clarify the nature of those rights which can constitute an easement. The 
original characteristics were: the need for a dominant and servient tenement; 
the requirement that the right must accommodate the dominant land; there 
must be two different owners and the right must be capable of being the 
subject matter of a grant. Accommodating the dominant tenement has been 
widely interpreted as benefiting the land rather than the landowner 
personally6. Examples7 include a right of way giving a more convenient route8, 
a right to park9, a right to light10; these will usually be held to benefit or 
accommodate the land itself and although clearly of benefit to any property 
owner they do not depend on the particular needs of a single property owner. 
In Ellenborough Park11 the key issue was whether the use of a park by the 
landowners in surrounding properties could be said to benefit land rather than 
the landowners personally.  A number of houses had been built around 
parkland and the owners claimed the right to walk in the park or as Evershed 
MR more formally put it as ‘the right of perambulation’.12 This was 
                                                          
5  re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131. 
6 See Hill v Tupper (1863) 2 H & C 121; compare Moody v Steggles (1879) 12 Ch D 261. 
7 For a much more extensive list of recognised easements see Gaunt and Morgan Gale on Easements 20th edn (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2017) at 1.76. 
8 See Borman v Griffiths [1930] 1 Ch 493; Mills v Silver [1991] Ch 271. 
9 See London & Blenheim Estates Ltd v Ladbroke Retail Parks Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1278. 
10 See Colls v Home and Colonial Stores Ltd [1904] AC 187. 
11  re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131. 
12  re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 140. 
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controversial. To what extent can a landowner argue that the right to enjoy 
walking in a park benefits the dominant tenement as opposed to the 
landowner? Could access to land be regarded as a part of land ownership? 
Evershed MR concluded that the right to use the grounds was a right known to 
law and it could be an easement. The claimants could use the land to wander 
at will and sit in appropriate places and possibly to enjoy a picnic.13 However 
the question of whether after your picnic you could play games in the park or 
hold a football match was not decided. Could you have idly thrown a Frisbee 
whilst walking about in the park or would this exceed permissive use? The 
Court of Appeal held that the use of the park could include use for the 
enjoyment of air and exercise and similar amenities.14 Evershed MR even went 
as far as to say in relation to Ellenborough Park that ‘… the enjoyment 
contemplated was the enjoyment of the vendors’ ornamental garden in its 
physical state … that is to say, of walking on or over those parts provided for 
such purpose that is, pathways and ….lawns; to rest upon the seats or other 
such places provided; and, if certain parts were set apart for particular 
recreations such as tennis or bowls, to use those parts for those purposes, 
subject again in the ordinary course, to the provision made for their 
regulation…’15  
                  Baker16 commented some years later that if Evershed MR was 
correct and there is a distinction between a ius spatiandi and the right enjoyed 
in re Ellenborough Park ‘…it could be said that the notion of objective purpose 
distinguishes a right to wander around a pleasure ground from a ius spatiandi. 
First, it gives the right a meaning that enables it to accommodate a dominant 
tenement. Secondly, it defines the scope of the privilege in a way that accords 
with the servient owner’s right to alter the pleasure ground’s layout…’ 
However Baker made a strong case for the ius spatiandi to be recognised in 
English law citing a number of other jurisdictions that already recognise it such 
a Canada17 and Australia18 as well as support from members of the judiciary19. 
                                                          
13  re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 141. 
14  re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 150 
15 re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 169. 
16 Adam Baker “Recreational Privileges as easements: law and policy” [2012] Conv 37 at 44. 
17 Dukart (1978) 86 DLR. 
18 City Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (NT) [2001] NTCA 7. 
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For Roger Smith the issue is simply one of seeing the right to wander at will as 
simply a form of ‘garden substitute’20.  
                    So in 1965 a number of questions were left open about the extent 
of rights that could be claimed if someone had use of open land of a 
neighbour. Evershed MR did envisage an extension of the use of land to some 
limited sporting activity but this reference was obiter and there was no 
extension to the definition of an easement to include the right to play sport.21  
 
THE CHANGING NATURE OF EASEMENTS 
                  For nearly two centuries the courts have notionally embraced the 
idea that easements should adapt to changes in society at least in spirit.  
           ‘…The law of servitude, no doubt, accommodates itself to the changing 
circumstances of society, and a new process or invention …. may be turned 
into servitude …’ 
This principle set down by Lord St Leonards in Dyce v Lady James Hay22 in 1852 
is frequently cited to illustrate the flexibility of the law with respect to 
easements. However it is not easy to find examples of where it was followed in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Traditionally, there was reluctance in 
the courts to recognise new easements even where adaption because of 
changing conditions and times. Writing in the Virginia Law Review23 in 1942 
Russell Reno reflected that although writers on Roman law24 had pointed out 
that there was no limit placed on the types of affirmative or negative 
servitudes that could be created, this attitude was not reflected in the way the 
English judges approached new servitudes or easements.25 He wrote 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
19 Baker cites Lord Hope in DPP v Jones (Margaret) [1999] 2 AC 340; Lord Patten in Beech v Kennerley [2011] 
EWCA Civ 666. 
20 Roger Smith Property Law 9th edn (Pearson 2017) p.515. 
21 re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 169. 
22 (1852) 15 D. (HL) 14 at 15. 
23 Russell Remo “The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in land: Part I” 28 Virginia Law Review Vol 28 951 
(1942). 
24 He refers to Buckland and McNair Roman and Common Law (1936) 109 as examples of writers on Roman Law who had 
reflected on the fact that Roman Law placed no limit on the types of new servitudes that could be created . 
25 Russell Remo “The enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land: Part I” Virginia Law Review 1942 Vol 28 No 7 951. 
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‘…unfortunately the conservatism of the English judges prevented them from 
taking this attitude in respect of easements and profits…’26 In the same article 
Reno refers to the words of Lord Brougham in Keppell v Bailey,27 a case better 
known perhaps in the context of restrictive covenants ‘….Incidents of a novel 
kind cannot be devised, and attached to property, at the fancy or caprice of 
any owner…’28 
Sixteen years later Cresswell J voiced a similar view in Ackroyd v Smith29  ‘….It is 
not in the power of a vendor to create new rights not connected with the use 
or enjoyment of land, and annex them to it: nor can the owner of land render 
it to a new species of burthen, so as to bind it in the hands of an assignee….’ 
Over the years attempts to create new easements such as an easement of 
protection from the weather30 and interference with television 
reception31have frequently failed. Gray comments that ‘…the imposition of 
severely limiting criteria has been rationalised as necessary to prevent the 
proliferation of undesirable long-term burdens which inhibit the marketability 
of land ….’32 Easements can undermine the rights of a landowner who has to 
concede legal rights of use and enjoyment to others and in this way they 
encumber the traditional notion that your home is your castle and you are free 
to enjoy it as and when you wish.33 However Gray also accepts that extending 
the range of easements may actually enhance land. ‘…Nowadays, however, it is 
far from clear that the tight definitional regulation of servitudes has any 
particularly beneficial effect. A more relaxed categorisation of allowable 
servitudes may actually enhance the enjoyment of land in a crowded 
environment, promoting rather than inhibiting the character of a locality and 
its consequent  attractiveness on the open market…’34  
                                                          
26 See Russell Remo  “The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land” at 958. 
27 2 My&K 517 (39 ER 1042). 
28 Keppell v Bailey 2 My&K at 535. 
29 (1850) 10 CB 164 at 188.  
30 Phipps v Pears [1965] 1 QB 76;  
31 Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655. 
32 K. Gray and S, Gray  Elements of Land Law 5th edn (Oxford: OUP 2009) at p. 616. 
33 “For a man’s house is his castle et domus sua cuique est tutissmum refugum.” Sir Edmund Coke. Institutes of the Laws of 
England [1628].  
34 K.Gray and S. Gray Elements of Land Law 5th edn (Oxford: OUP. 2009) at p. 616. 
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                      In more recent years the courts appear to have embraced change 
more readily. One recent extension to the range of rights has been an 
easement allowing noise from a race track.35 In Coventry v Lawrence36 
landowners living near a speedway and stock car stadium brought an action 
challenging the right of the owner of the stadium to make noise during events 
held there. Reversing the decision in the Court of Appeal where the claim of 
the neighbouring landowners had been upheld the Supreme Court held that 
there can be an easement to create noise enforceable against the owners of 
neighbouring properties and such a right can arise through prescription37.  
                      One of the main obstacles to extending the categories of 
easements has been the need for clarity both the conditions which must be 
satisfied in order for the right to arise and also the extent of the right granted. 
Easements must be clearly defined so that both the servient and dominant 
owners are well aware of the extent of their rights. If these rights are exceeded 
the servient owner can then challenge the dominant owner in the courts and 
likewise the dominant owner can challenge if he/she feels that the servient 
owner has prevented the proper exercise of the easement. It was the 
vagueness of definition that was seen as the obstacle in Hunter v Canary 
Wharf38. The lack of clarity in definition had also prevented a claimant 
centuries earlier from claiming as an easement a right to a view39 and likewise 
in Browne v Flower40 the courts would not recognise a right to privacy. These 
problems in definition had not deterred the Supreme Court in Coventry v 
Lawrence41 from finding a prescriptive easement of a right to make noise. 
Prescriptive easements require proof of use without force, stealth or 
permission over a period of twenty years. Satisfying the requirements for 
prescription in this case could have been problematic as noted by Martin Dixon 
‘… the noise is likely to vary in intensity over time; it may be intermittent and it 
must endure for at least twenty years…’42 These difficulties were recognised by 
                                                          
35 Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13.  
36 Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13. 
37 Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13. 
38 Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655. 
39 William Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b (77 ER 816). 
40 [1911] 1 Ch 219. 
41 Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13. 
42 Martin Dixon “The Sound of Silence” [2014] 78 Conv 79. 
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Lord Neuberger in his judgment in the Supreme Court but he dismissed them 
as practical problems which in principle would not prevent a claim for the 
easement.43 The approach of the court in this case was one of pragmatism. 
Once an easement has been found then it is for the court to solve any practical 
issues although this in itself is problematic.  This suggests that the old obstacles 
of extent of the easement or uncertainty of definition can be met by taking a 
case by case approach. Emma Lees comments on the attitude of the court in 
Coventry ‘…if imposing constraints on such a right proves difficult in practice 
(due to uncertainty over permitted levels or time or use), the courts are likely 
to develop an approach which can impose certainty onto what could 
potentially be a vague right…’44   It appears that the courts have somewhat 
relaxed their attitude to extending the range of recognised easements and it 
may be that the words of Lord St Leonards in Dyce45 that the range of 
recognised easements is not fixed has far more truth today. The challenge 
made by the claimants in Regency Villas46 was to the core of what rights can 
constitute an easement. Sporting and recreational rights were not recognised 
as easements47 in spite of Evershed MR’s brief reference to the right to play 
tennis and bowls in Re Ellenborough48 and unless there was an extension to 
include such rights the claim would automatically fail.  
IUS SPATIANDI OR THE RIGHT TO WALK AT WILL 
                     For an easement to be found in re Ellenborough Park Evershed MR 
had had to overturn or at least attempt to compromise the principle that an 
easement cannot encompass a ius spatiandi a principle derived from the 
Roman law of servitudes and which Evershed MR described ‘as the right to 
wander at will over all and every part of another’s field or park’49. Evershed MR 
questioned the extent to which this principle from Roman law had ever been 
adopted into English law.  ‘…apart from the opinion of Farwell J there has been 
…no judicial authority for adopting the Roman view in this respect into the 
                                                          
43 Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13 at para 38. 
44 Emma Lees “Lawrence v Fen Tigers: Where now for Nuisance?” [2014] 78 Conv 449 at 452.  
45 Dyce v Lady James Hay (1852) 1 Macq 305. 
46 Regency Villas Title Ltd and other v Diamond Resorts (Europe) Ltd and another [2017] EWCA Civ 238. 
47 Mounsay v Ismay (1865) 3 Hurlstone and Coltman 486. 
48 Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 169. 
49 Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 176. 
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English law….’ 50 He then considered the ius spatiandi in the context of a 
number of earlier cases and sources.51 Although these cases are useful in 
shedding light as to how the courts viewed the principle they mainly concern 
the right of the public in general to enjoy an open space rather than the private 
right of an individual over a neighbour’s land and so there is a significant 
material difference in these cases to the facts of Re Ellenborough Park and 
Regency Villas.  
                       In Dyce v Lady James Hay52 Robert Dyce claimed that he, along 
with the other inhabitants of Aberdeen, as well as members of the public 
generally, had the right to use a footpath along the River Don which flowed 
through the defendant’s estate. The claim for a right of way was not 
problematic but he also sought a declaration that he and the other groups had 
the right to use a strip of land between the footpath and the river for ‘the 
purpose of recreation and taking air and exercise by walking over and through 
the same, and resting thereon as they saw proper’. These rights were similar to 
those claimed in Ellenborough Park and by using the word ‘recreation’ could 
encompass something more than mere ‘perambulation’ and perhaps include 
sport. On the facts Lord St Leonards was not prepared to find that rights had 
arisen because of the sheer extent of the rights that could be enjoyed. In his 
view the court could not restrict in such a way that only part of the land could 
be enjoyed in this way. In his view ‘…All the servitudes hitherto recognised 
sanctioned no principle which would entitle a party not merely to walk and 
recreate over public grounds, but over the enclosed domain of a private 
gentleman,—a right inconsistent with property’.53  
                       Easements have often been denied where it appears that the 
servient owner is prevented from enjoying his or her land. This can be a 
temporary deprivation of rights54 or a more substantial denial such as 
storage55. There is a difference between a claim that is excessive but is 
recognised as an easement and a claim that fails ab initio because it is a right 
                                                          
50 Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 163. 
51 Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 180.  
52 Dyce v Lady James Hay (1852) 15 D. (HL) 14. 
53 Dyce v Lady James Hay (1852) 15 D. (HL) 14 at 15. 
54 E.g. the use of the lavatory Miller v Emcer Products Ltd  [1956] Ch 304. 
55 E.g. Wright v Macadam [1949]2 KB 744. 
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that falls outside those rights that can be recognised as easements. Dyce 
appears to fall under the first group. An easement could have been granted 
but for the extent of use by the claimant group. The judge was concerned at 
the way the rights claimed would undermine the enjoyment of the landowner. 
Similar issues had arisen in Attorney-General v Antrobus 56 and again public 
rights to enjoy land were at issue. The claim failed in this case because it fell 
under the second group namely the court felt that the right could not be 
recognised as an easement at all. The issue of extent of the rights therefore 
was not considered in this case. A claim was made by the Attorney-General for 
members of the public to have the right of access to Stonehenge. The 
defendant Mr Antrobus who had succeeded to the estate five years earlier 
argued that he had a right to fence off the land as owner of the monument and 
he could therefore prevent the public from entering the area by certain roads 
running up to and through the monument. By contrast the Attorney-General 
on behalf of the general public argued that there had been access to 
Stonehenge for centuries for a range of purposes including public worship, the  
burial of the dead and even for deliberation of public affairs. He was relying on 
rights that had arisen through long use producing evidence that the public had 
had access to the monument for many centuries and such rights could not be 
denied. Farwell J held that the general public cannot acquire by user a right to 
visit a public monument or other object of interest upon private property. In 
his view the general public could not claim a right simply to walk about on land 
of another, in this case Stonehenge stating: 
 ‘…It is impossible for the court, under those circumstances, to make any such 
presumption as is suggested. The public as such cannot prescribe, nor is the ius 
spatiandi known to our law as a possible subject-matter of grant or 
prescription’ adding ‘…and for such things as can have no lawful beginning, nor 
be created at this day by any manner of grant, or reservation, or deed that can 
be supposed, no prescription is good…’ 57 
                                                          
56 [1905] 2 Ch 188. 
57 Attorney-General v Antrobus [1905] 2 Ch 188 at 198. 
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                      Stonehenge now has the status of a public monument58 and the 
public do have a right of access today but it is not by means of an easement as 
claimed in Antrobus59.  
                       Farwell J had previously referred to the status of the ius spatiandi 
in International Tea Stores v Hobbs60. Here the claim was for a right of way 
through the defendant’s land. It was for a private right of access over the land 
of another and so the circumstances were much closer to those of 
Ellenborough Park and also to the claimants in Regency Villas although limited 
to a right of way rather than general enjoyment of the land. The claimants had 
originally leased the property but had later purchased the freehold. The right 
of way had been a purely permissive use whilst the claimants were tenants. 
Farwell J differentiated between the right of way which he was prepared to 
grant and the wider right of general enjoyment which he would not recognise. 
He illustrated the difference between the two in his dismissal of the case for 
the defendant ‘…the instance suggested by Lord Coleridge in his argument 
illustrates my meaning: he put the case of a man living in a house at his 
landlord’s park gate, and having leave to use … the drive as a means of access 
to church or town, and to use … the gardens and park for his enjoyment, and 
asked, ‘Would such a man on buying his house with the rights given by section 
6 of the Conveyancing Act61 acquire a right of way over the drive, and a right to 
use the gardens and Park?’ My answer is ‘Yes’ to the first, and ‘No’ to the 
second question, because the first is a right the existence of which is known to 
the law, and the latter, being a mere ius spatiandi is not known….’62 Farwell J 
drew a very clear distinction between the right to pass over a neighbour’s land 
for access and the right to enjoy a neighbour’s land for pleasure and 
enjoyment. In Attorney-General v Antrobus63 the right claimed was not a right 
of passage from A to B but instead the right to access the area to enjoy 
                                                          
58 The last remaining member of the Antrobus family died in the First World War and Stonehenge was purchased at auction 
by Cecil Chubb in 1915 who then donated it to the nation. http://www.english-heritage.org.uk/about-us/search-
news/StonehengeSold100yearsago. 
59 Attorney-General v Antrobus [1905] 2 Ch 188. 
60 International Tea Stores v Hobbs [1903] 2 Ch 165. 
61 Conveyancing Act 1881.Now replaced by s.62 Law of Property Act. 
62 International Tea Stores v Hobbs [1903] 2 Ch 165 at 172. 
63 Attorney-General v Antrobus [1905] 2 Ch 188. 
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Stonehenge. By contrast in International Tea Stores64 there was a right to pass 
over the land which Farwell J had accepted. 
                       In order for the claimants in Re Ellenborough Park65 to succeed 
the court would have to accept that the claimants had a right to enjoy the land 
for walking about and so he had either to find that the ius spatiandi had no 
place in English law or that the right claimed was of a different nature. The 
claimants were not seeking a right of way of access from A to B; their claim 
was a right to enjoy the grounds and so was much closer to Attorney-General v 
Antrobus66 than the right in International Tea Stores67. In distinguishing 
between the two decisions of Farwell J Evershed MR considered the status of 
all rights of way and held that enjoyment of such a right is not necessarily 
restricted to the passage from A to B but could include a right to walk about 
whilst gaining access. Indeed Coleridge J had commented over a century earlier 
in ‘…Has not the inhabitant of the square a right to cross the square, included 
in his right to walk about the square?’ 68 
Duncan v Louch was heard by no less than three High Court judges as well as 
Lord Denman LJ the Lord Chief Justice and each used the opportunity to 
discuss the nature of a right of way. Lord Denman commented ‘...the right as 
pleaded is unlimited, to walk, pass and repass at his and their free will and 
pleasure; there is nothing said about the particular occasions of walking; that is 
an exact description of the use which parties make of such a terrace..’69 
Wightman J. in agreement with the Lord Chief Justice added ‘… I also am of 
opinion that this rule must be discharged. The right proved in evidence is a 
right of passage backwards and forwards over every part of the close: the right 
claimed is less than this, but is included in it, being a right of way from one part 
of the close to another.70 Farwell J did not refer to this decision in either 
                                                          
64 International Tea Stores v Hobbs [1903] 2 Ch 165. 
65 Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131. 
66 Attorney-General v Antrobus [1905] 2 Ch 188. 
67 International Tea Stores v Hobbs [1903] 2 Ch 165. 
68 Duncan v Louch (1845) 6 Q.B. 904 at 910. 
69 Duncan v Louch (1845) 6 Q.B. 904 at 911. 
70 Duncan v Louch (1845) 6 QB 904 at 911. 
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Antrobus71 or International Tea Stores v Hobbs72. If he had done so perhaps he 
may have taken a different view on the status of the ius spatiandi.  
                     So one could argue that even in the nineteenth century there had 
been a real challenge to the principle of ius spatiandi and the limits that it 
placed on the nature of an easement. Evershed MR was able to grant an 
easement to the claimants in re Ellenborough Park by differentiating between 
their claim and the ius spatiandi.  He was rather dismissive of the application 
that Farwell J had made of the ius spatiandi in Antrobus and Hobbs. ‘…Farwell J 
was a judge of great learning and all his judicial utterances merit and are 
accorded more than ordinary respect; but in his, as in all judgments, more 
weight should be attached to that which was necessary for the decision of the 
case than to that which was merely obiter. It is plain that Farwell J’s reference, 
in the passage quoted73, to the ius spatiandi formed no necessary part of his 
judgment, and it is to be noted that he did not refer to any authority in support 
of it…’74 However Evershed MR continued ‘…it must nevertheless be conceded 
that in the view of the learned judge the right of a man to use, as appurtenant 
to his own property, the gardens and park of another is a right the existence of 
which is not known to the law, even though that right be expressly 
granted….’75    
                        In order to find for the claimants Evershed MR had to show that 
there was a distinction between the ius spatiandi and a right to enjoy a garden 
by walking about. The distinction is subtle and it is questionable whether there 
is indeed any difference. For Evershed MR there was a difference between 
wandering at will over an open space as described by the jurist Paul and 
referred to by Radcliffe in his seminal text on Land Law76 and enjoying the 
gardens in re Ellenborough Park. Radcliffe had written of easements as follows 
‘…the easement must be calculated to benefit the dominant tenement as a 
tenement, and not merely to confer a personal advantage on the owner of it. 
This principle is directly derived from the Roman law of servitudes and is well 
                                                          
71 Atoorney-General v Antrobus [1905] 2 Ch 188. 
72 International Tea Stores Co v Hobbs [1903] 2 Ch 165. 
73 Evershed MR was referring here to International Tea Stores Co v Hobbs [1903] 2 Ch 165.  
74 Re Ellenborough Park [1956] 131 at 181. 
75 Re Ellenborough Park [1956] 131 at 181. 
76 Radcliffe Real Property Law 1st edn (Oxford University Press 1933) at p.131. 
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illustrated by the Roman jurist Paul77 when he says you cannot have a 
servitude giving you the right to wander about and picnic in another man’s 
land…’78 Although Evershed MR found that there was such a difference he also 
sought to justify his decision by making the point that life in Rome as observed 
by Paul and life experienced by those who were part of the urban development 
of the 1950s in England including the owners of the properties next to 
Ellenborough Park was very different. Evershed MR saw a distinction in the 
nature of rights that could be claimed. ‘…Moreover, the exact characteristics of 
the ius spatiandi mentioned by Roman lawyers has to be considered. It by no 
means follows that the kind of right which is here in question, arising out of a 
method of urban development that would not have been known to Roman 
lawyers, can in any case be said to fall within its scope…’79  
                    He continued ‘…And in any event, its validity must depend in our 
judgment, upon a consideration of the qualities which must now be attributed 
to all easements by the law relating to easements as it has now developed in 
England..’80 His judgment is often seen as placing limitations on the nature of 
an easement but it also has references to both the flexibility of easements and 
the possibility of extending the rights claimed beyond those of merely walking. 
Above all the clear principle emerges that the right to enjoy the gardens and 
the parkland was one that falls naturally within property and home ownership.  
In emphasising this point he referred to a work by Francis Bacon ‘An Essay of 
Gardens’81 where Bacon wrote ‘..no doubt a garden is a pleasure  - on high 
authority, it is the purest of pleasures…’ In upholding the rights to enjoy the 
grounds of Ellenborough Park Evershed MR was upholding the rights of all 
property owners to have the right to enjoy an open space and a garden. He 
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seemed to suggest that this was as natural an attribute of property as other 
previously known easements such as storage or rights of way.  
‘….The right here ….is…. appurtenant to the surrounding houses as such, and 
constitutes a beneficial attribute of residence in a house as ordinarily 
understood. Its use for the purposes, not only of exercise and rest but also for 
such domestic purposes as… for example, for taking out small children in 
perambulators …is not fairly to be described as one of mere recreation or 
amusement and it is clearly beneficial to the premises to which it is 
attached…’82  
Of course this conclusion can still be questioned sixty years later because 
walking about a garden at will with no particular purpose in mind other than 
enjoying the fresh air and the open space seems to bear an uncanny similarity 
to the very right criticised by Paul and later Farwell J the ius spatiandi. Does 
wheeling a pram or having a picnic give such a right validity? The better view is 
to argue that Evershed MR was adhering to the reflection by Lord St Leonards 
that easements must reflect changes and life in suburban England in the 1950s. 
CAN RECREATIONAL OR SPORTING EASEMENTS BE GRANTED? 
                           The decision in re Ellenborough Park went some way to 
extending recognised easements. It allowed the right of enjoyment of 
another’s land for walking about and not just for getting from point A to point 
B. The decision overcame the problems previously perceived with the ius 
spatiandi but in spite of obiter comments by Evershed MR on the possibilities 
of playing sport in the park83it did not extend the rights to sporting and 
recreational easements. He made the point that walking about in a garden was 
in his view a natural extension of rights for anyone who owns land. For him 
walking was ‘…a beneficial attribute of residence in a house as ordinarily 
understood..’ He added ‘…its use for the purposes, not only of exercise and 
rest but also for such domestic purposes …. For example for taking out small 
children in perambulators or otherwise – is not fairly to be described as one of 
mere recreation or amusement, and is clearly beneficial to the premises to 
                                                          
82 Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 179. 
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which it is attached...’84 However he felt bound by Baron Martin’s judgment in 
Mounsey v Ismay85 where the judge had drawn a clear distinction between 
rights which were of utility and rights that were mere recreation.  In Mounsey v 
Ismay86 the freemen and citizens of the town of Carlisle claimed the right to 
enter land in the hamlet of Kingsmoor on Ascension Day every year in order to 
hold horse races. As in Attorney-General v Antrobus87 the right claimed was a 
public as opposed to a private right but the principles laid down were 
applicable to both types of cases. The claim was based on prescriptive use; 
proof of twenty years long use without permission, secrecy or force. The claim 
failed on the nature of the right claimed and not on the proof of prescriptive 
use. Although some issue was taken as to whether a group of individuals can 
enjoy an easement, the key obstacle to finding an easement was that the right 
claimed could not constitute an easement because it provided pleasure and 
was therefore merely recreational. The law was summed up by Martin B who 
referred in detail to Gale on Easements88 as follows: 
‘….to bring the right within the term ‘easement’ …it must be one analogous to 
that of a right of way or a right of watercourse, and must be a right of utility 
and benefit, and not one of mere recreation and amusement…’89  
As Gray comments ‘...there can, in short, be no easement merely to have fun 
....’90 Evershed MR had firmly differentiated between ‘having fun’ as in 
watching and taking part in horse racing and merely walking about in a garden. 
In his view the latter constituted a right of utility and benefit essential to any 
landowner whereas the former did not enhance the land because it was not 
essential to home ownership. This was the key issue. One of the questions that 
any court must examine in considering claims for an easement is whether the 
right benefits or accommodates the land and the judgement in Mounsey v 
                                                          
84 Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 at 179. 
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Ismay91 clearly holds that enjoying land for pleasure prevents a right from 
becoming an easement. It fails to accommodate the land as it fails to provide 
utility or benefit. For the claimants in Regency Villas92 the key issue was 
whether enjoying land for sport was merely recreational and merely for 
pleasure or did it provide utility or benefit to them. In order for their claim to 
succeed the court would need to view the use of the facilities in Broom Park 
Estate as being akin to the use of the Park in re Ellenborough Park93 by the 
neighbouring landowners and going beyond mere recreation, otherwise the 
decision in Mounsey v Ismay94would have to be overturned. Everything rested 
in Regency Villas95 on the view taken by the court of an individual’s enjoyment 
of sporting facilities in twenty-first century Canterbury. Was such enjoyment 
similar to enjoying the facility of a garden, indeed essential to one’s very 
existence or was such enjoyment merely recreational? Even in 1955 not 
everyone would have relished walking about in a garden,96 so the fact that the 
enjoyment was not seen of utility to all would not necessarily defeat the claim. 
Likewise if the court viewed sport and recreation as of utility and benefit in 
twenty-first century England it would not defeat the claim to have evidence 
that there were groups of people who did not regard access to sports facilities 
as of benefit or utility to ownership of property. 
                         There is useful dicta on the use of land for recreation albeit 
obiter in the context of the facts from McCullough J in R v Metropolitan 
Borough Council97 decided some years after Re Ellenborough Park.98 An 
application was made by way of judicial review for a declaration that an area of 
land, Doncaster Common, was an open space within the meaning of the Local 
Government Act 197299, if this were so, a particular procedure had to be 
adopted by the Council who intended to lease it to a private golf club. The 
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claimant Mr Braim had to show that the land was used for recreational 
purposes. Indeed it had been used for a range of activities in the past. The best 
known use was as a racecourse in particular as the location for a famous horse 
race of the flat season, the St Leger; but it was also used as a golf course and 
for activities such as jogging, kite flying and simply walking. There was no 
dispute that such activities took place but the Council argued that this was 
merely a concession by the Council who did not seek to enforce its rights in 
trespass. McCullough J drew an inference that the public had as ‘of right’ used 
Doncaster Common for recreation having reviewed both Mounsay v Ismay100 
and re Ellenborough Park 101. He distinguished Baron Martin’s comment that a 
right to hold races cannot be held to be the subject matter of a grant because 
it was for mere amusement and recreation102 and was a mere licence and held 
that such comments were merely obiter and would not restrict his own 
conclusions.103 He referred instead to two decisions the first Tyne Improvement 
Commissioners v Imrie; Att-Gen v Tyne Commissioners104 where land had been 
dedicated to the public for such activities as bathing and fishing and a second 
case re Haddon105 where land had been dedicated to the public for recreation. 
He concluded on the first case that ‘…bathing to say nothing of fishing is pure 
recreation…’106 In allowing the application for judicial review McCullough J 
accepted that land may be dedicated to the public for the purpose of 
recreation and such a purpose would be recognised by the courts.107 
                   It appears that there have been a number of judges over past 
centuries who have entertained the thought of extending the definition of an 
easement to include recreational rights and there is a suggestion in the 
judgments in these cases that the Judiciary were moving to the view that 
sporting rights were of utility and benefit per se. Perhaps the loyal adherence 
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to the decision in Mounsey v Ismay108 was itself at the very least misguided and 
quite possibly flawed given the context of the case. 
THE DECISION IN REGENCY VILLAS   
                  The rights claimed in Regency Villas were over recreational facilities 
at Broome Park Estate, a mansion house near Canterbury with large grounds 
including Italianate gardens. The facilities were very extensive and included an   
indoor and outdoor swimming pool, 18-hole golf course, 3 squash courts, two 
outdoor hard-surfaced tennis courts, a putting green and a croquet lawn. 
Inside the Mansion House there were further facilities including a reception, a 
billiard-room and a TV room on the ground floor a restaurant, bar, gym, 
sunbed and sauna area, later converted into an indoor swimming pool. Before 
1981 the entire estate was owned by a company called Gulf Investments but 
this was later divided and sold. The first claimant in the case was the owner of 
Eltham House, Canterbury which was part of the original estate and the second 
to fifth claimants were owners of timeshare apartments which were built in 
the grounds. Although the actual transfer from Gulf Investments had been lost 
by the time the case came to court the entry on the register had recorded that 
the land transferred had the benefit of rights including rights of way; rights of 
passage for key services such as gas and water and finally rights to enjoy 
certain facilities including the swimming pool, the golf course, the squash 
courts, tennis courts and ground and basement rooms on the transferor’s 
adjoining estate. The key question to be decided was whether the rights to 
enjoy the facilities such as the swimming pool and golf course were property 
rights passing with the land or merely personal rights to be enjoyed by the 
owner at the time which could not be passed on to a subsequent transferee. 
                       In the High Court109, Judge Purle revisited the four characteristics 
from re Ellenborough Park.110 He had no difficulty with the first two 
characteristics: there were clearly two tenements; a dominant and servient 
tenement and they were each owned by different people. Perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly he was also satisfied that the rights in question did accommodate 
                                                          
108 Mounsey v Ismay (1865) 3 Hurlstone and Coltman 486; 159 E.R. 621. 
109  [2015] EWHC 3564(Ch). 




the land enjoyed by the claimants. He found that the right to enjoy these 
facilities enhanced the claimants’ land in just the same way as enjoyment of 
the pleasure gardens had enhanced the enjoyment of the claimants in re 
Ellenborough Park. ‘… The use cannot be regarded as a mere right of recreation 
unconnected with the timeshare land. The extensive facilities are very 
obviously a major attraction of the timeshare units themselves and would have 
been a significant attraction for the occupiers of Eltham House had the 
intended development of the Regency Villas never gone ahead…’111 He 
continued ‘…In short the adjacent facilities are connected with and part of the 
normal enjoyment of the timeshare land and must therefore be regarded as 
accommodating that land, just as, in Ellenborough Park the right to the full 
enjoyment of an ornamental pleasure ground was held to accommodate the 
surrounding plots…’ 112For him the main problem lay in the fourth 
characteristic namely that the right must be capable of being the subject 
matter of a grant. In order to address this he identified three concerns: 
i) Whether the rights were expressed in language which was too wide and too 
vague; 
ii) Whether such rights would amount to rights of joint occupation or 
substantially deprive the park owners of proprietorship or legal possession; 
iii) Whether such rights would constitute mere rights of recreation, possessing no 
quality of utility or benefit.113 
           The Judge found that the rights had been expressed in clear language. 
There was nothing vague or excessively wide. He found that the rights 
extended to all recreational and sporting facilities on the estate and to the 
gardens subject to rules and regulations laid down by the defendants.114 He 
also found that the claimants had rights to facilities which had been improved 
or introduced since the conveyance in 1981. In his view ‘….to construe the 
rights as limited to the actual facilities which were on site or planned in 1981 is 
unrealistic and might inhibit the servient owner from introducing 
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improvements or replacements or adding facilities which would be for 
everyone’s benefit….’115 This was a bold assertion since the rights claimed were 
very wide and there had been number of changes since 1981. Although there 
were rules and regulations on use there was no specific limit laid down on use. 
116 
                  Judge Purle also dismissed the possible obstacles of joint user and of 
deprivation of the owners of enjoyment.117 This was a point raised in Moncrieff 
v Jamieson118and the Supreme Court had addressed this issue by looking at the 
nature of the landowner’s rights. ‘…The fact that the servient proprietor is 
excluded from part of his property is not necessarily inimical to the existence 
of a servitude…’119  He found that even where joint user had been at issue an 
easement had still been found. 120 According to Judge Purle the question was 
whether there had been substantial interference with the rights. For him there 
must be an element of ‘give and take’ between the servient and dominant 
owner.121 Use of the swimming pool on a hot day could appear to be a similar 
scenario. The use of the facility by the claimants could amount to joint user 
with the defendants. Indeed in this case there were potentially a large number 
of claimants amounting to over one hundred and fifty people but in his view 
this was not problematic as the estate was large and it could readily cope with 
the number of people who could potentially enjoy the facilities.122 In an 
argument reminiscent of those of Lord Scott in Moncrieff123 Judge Purle 
pointed out that the defendants still retained a range of rights denied to the 
claimants. ‘…The defendants are in possession and control of all the facilities 
on site. They regulate the use of those facilities and run the estate as a 
commercial business open to the public as well as to time share owners. They 
have in no sense been ousted and their ability to exercise ownership rights and 
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to remain in possession remains….’124 He continued ‘….the defendants are not 
prevented from altering the layout of the estate to its best advantage and … 
there have in fact been many alterations and additions over the years. They 
are not sharing joint possession but control the site and manage the various 
facilities, including the determination of opening and closing times…’125 He 
pointed out that by contrast the rights of the claimants were very limited. They 
could not dig up plants and trees which they did not like or remove sand from 
the bunkers on the golf course for a sandpit at home. These were rights 
enjoyed by defendants and so would be denied to the claimants.126  
                He finally considered the issue of the recreational rights. In his view it 
was just a small step to take the rights enjoyed by the claimants in re 
Ellenborough Park 127 to the enjoyment of sporting or recreational facilities. He 
found that there was no English (or Scottish) authority authoritatively 
determining whether or not an easement can exist to use (say) a golf course, 
swimming pool or tennis court, he concluded ‘… in my judgment there is no 
legal impediment to the grant of such an easement, provided the intention to 
grant the easement, as opposed to a merely personal right, is evident on the 
proper construction of the grant….’128 Therefore relying on a wealth of 
authorities from Canada and Australia,129 where the courts had upheld 
easements for sporting and recreational purposes, Judge Purle was able to 
uphold all the rights as easements. He was concerned that the judgment of 
Lord Scott in Moncreiff130 might have been fatal to the claim since Lord Scott 
had stated unequivocally ‘…I doubt whether the grant of a right to use a 
neighbour’s swimming pool could ever qualify as a servitude…’131 The key 
problem for Lord Scott was the obligation to ensure there was water in the 
pool. ‘…The grantor, the swimming pool owner,  would be under no obligation 
to keep the pool full of water and the grantee would be in no position to fill it if 
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the grantor chose…’ 132  As a result he found that the right to use a swimming 
pool would be no more than an in personam contractual right at best. Judge 
Purle dismissed these comments in spite of the partial similarity to the facts 
holding that the example given by Lord Scott had no application in the present 
case.133 The key point for Judge Purle was the context of the case. The grant 
had been made to timeshare purchasers by developers and so the rights 
promised were crucial to their enjoyment. This finding suggests that his 
decision may have been different had the claimants owned an ordinary 
domestic property albeit promised with the right to use sporting and or 
recreation facilities of the neighbouring vendor.134 Indeed he alludes to this 
point commenting ‘….I am not concerned with neighbours in the purely 
domestic context but with a grant made by a developer for a number of 
timeshare owners….thus I do not see why the claimants could not provide their 
own water supply…if they needed to fill the pool….’135 Judge Purle upheld all 
the claims including rights to use facilities in the Mansion House such as use of 
the bar, the television room and the snooker and billiard room. 
                  The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal which not surprising 
given that the charges for use of these facilities, if they were not declared 
easements, could be very substantial and would raise considerable. For the 
claimants a finding in their favour would increase their own enjoyment of the 
timeshare properties, reduce costs and undoubtedly enhance the value of each 
property. 
                 The grounds of appeal were based on three main issues. Firstly, that 
the rights could not amount to easements because the facilities could only be 
maintained at considerable expense; secondly, that the rights granted could 
not extend to facilities not even contemplated at the time of the 1981 transfer; 
and thirdly, that the rights granted comprised at best a bundle of rights which 
the judge failed to unpack.  
               The defendants had relied on the first issue arguing that as the 
claimants had conceded that it was possible for them to withdraw the facilities 
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and close their business at any time then there could not be an easement. The 
Court of Appeal dismissed this stating that it had long been held that there is 
no obligation on the servient owner to construct, maintain or repair a right of 
way or any other easement over servient land and held that on this basis even 
if the servient owners went out of business or ceased to maintain the facilities 
there would be no reason why valid easements would lapse. Further, the 
dominant owners could enter the land to themselves repair and maintain the 
facilities at their own expense.136 
                 The second ground of appeal was potentially more problematic. The 
difficult question was whether the grant was only for a right to use recreational 
facilities that existed at the time of the grant or whether it extended to 
replacement or substituted facilities. Judge Purle had held that the grant 
clearly extended to all sporting and recreational facilities on the Broome Park 
Estate and to the gardens and facilities that were neither there nor planned in 
1981 or which may have been significantly improved since then.137 There was 
some caution from the Court of Appeal to this approach. The court was only 
prepared to uphold rights that were in the contemplation of the parties at the 
time of grant not future rights different in nature from the rights in existence 
at the time of grant. ‘…Moreover there is no element of futurity in the words 
used, so we cannot see how they can be construed as including any future 
sporting or recreational facilities that might later be provided by the 
defendants on their own land…’138 The court was prepared to accept that the 
grant would extend to new or improved facilities139 and even extensions to 
existing facilities where there had been a substitution or a facility had been 
moved from one location to another. 140 On the facts the new indoor 
swimming pool built in the basement of the Mansion House fell outside the 
ambit of a substituted facility although the court had upheld the use of the 
outdoor heated swimming pool as an easement141 the new indoor pool was 
outside the terms of the 1981 grant. The court was keen to reject rights that 
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were too wide in range. As stated by Sir Geoffrey Vos C ‘…we do not think that 
the grant was a free ranging easement or an easement at will…’142 This is 
important as it makes it clear that any claim to new or changed facilities can 
only take effect by strict construction of the terms of the original grant. 
                  The final grounds of appeal were by far the most far-reaching since 
this touched on the nature of the rights and the crucial issue of whether 
recreational and sporting rights can take effect as easements. The Court of 
Appeal suggested that it would have been better if the Judge  had ‘unpacked’ 
each of the easements in turn rather than to see them as one grant particularly 
as pointed out by Sir Geoffrey Vos C that ‘…some of the grants had never 
before been specifically recognised by English law…’143  
                      Sir Geoffrey Vos C revisited re Ellenborough Park144 and the 
principle laid down that an easement can exist allowing the right to use a park 
as a garden with ancillary rights such as resting on seats. He reflected on the 
fact that rights which were considered as ‘mere recreation or amusement’ 
could not constitute easements.145 He continued ‘…Easements in the modern 
world must, of course, retain their essential qualities. But the views of society 
as to what is mere recreation and amusement may change, even if the 
exclusion of such rights were authoritative…’146 He placed much weight on the 
benefits in modern society of playing sport asserting, ‘…physical exercise is 
now regarded by most people in the United Kingdom as either an essential or 
at least a desirable part of their daily routines. It is not a mere recreation or 
amusement. Physical exercise can, moreover, in our modern lives, take many 
forms, whether it be walking, swimming or playing active games and sports. 
We cannot see how an easement could either in 1981 or in 2017 be ruled out 
solely on the grounds that the form of physical exercise it envisaged was a 
game or sport rather than purely a walk in a garden…’147                                  
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                     He then considered the decision of Mounsey v Ismay148 and Baron 
Martin’s emphasis on the need for an easement to provide ‘utility and benefit’ 
rather than ‘mere recreation and amusement’. He decided that the crucial 
question was what constituted ‘a right of utility and benefit’.149 ‘…The essence 
of an easement is to give the dominant tenement a benefit or utility as such. 
Thus, an easement properly so called will improve the general utility of the 
dominant tenement…an easement should not in the modern world be held to 
be invalid on the ground that it was ‘mere recreation or amusement’ because 
the form of physical exercise it envisaged was a game or sport….’150 In view of 
the changing nature of what constitutes utility in modern times he felt able to 
overrule the decision in Mounsay151 ‘….to be clear, we do not regard Baron 
Martin’s dictum as binding on this court, and we would decline to follow it 
insofar as it suggests that an easement cannot be held to exist in respect of a 
right to engage in recreational physical activities on servient land….’152  
                    The Court then dealt with each claim separately upholding the use 
of the gardens, the tennis courts, the squash courts, the putting green and 
croquet lawn and the existing outdoor heated swimming pool as well as the 
golf course all as easements. The Court rejected the other claims over the 
ground floor of the Mansion House including the reception, the billiard room 
and television room and held them to be no more than personal rights to use 
recreational facilities. The restaurant, gym and bar and sunbed and sauna 
areas were also rejected as easements as they could not exist without the 
provision of chattels. Sir Geoffrey Vos C differentiated between the benefits of 
playing certain sports such as tennis and squash compared to the benefits of 
playing snooker or watching television. He commented ‘…What we have said 
about the modern approach of taking physical exercise is not really applicable 
to recreational indoor games such as snooker or watching television…’ 153 
Although his overall view on the value of sport in twentieth-first century life 
was to be welcomed his views on specific sports seemed to be arbitrary. The 
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distinction between croquet and bowls and likewise snooker and billiards is 
very fine and the energy expended in both could be very similar whereas the 
use of the gym, which was rejected as an easement would normally require far 
greater expenditure of energy. The significance of this decision must lie in its 
recognition of recreational and sporting rights as easements which has long 
been denied in English law unlike other jurisdictions such as Australia154. Kevin 
Gray reflected in 2008 ‘…The judicial animus against recreational easements 
has undoubtedly receded in recent times. It may be an index of a more 
hedonistic (or even a more health conscious) age that it no longer seems 
inappropriate to acknowledge the easement character of certain recreational 
facilities annexed to dominant land…’155 
                       The decision is potentially very wide-reaching. Rights previously 
denied because they were a right of ‘mere recreation or amusement’ can 
today take effect as a legal easement and be binding on the current and all 
subsequent owners of the servient land.  
WHETHER AN EASEMENT CAN EXIST WHERE THE SERVIENT OWNER HAS A 
POSITIVE OBLIGATION  
The final question discussed by both courts was the extent to which the issue 
was affected by positive obligations on the servient owner. Some years earlier 
Lord Scott had questioned in Moncrieff156 whether use of a swimming pool 
could constitute an easement because of the obligation of the servient owner 
to fill and maintain the pool. The servient owner should not have any positive 
obligation imposed merely permissive use and enjoyment of his land. Kevin 
Gray describes the limits on the servient owner thus ‘…an easement requires 
of the servient owner nothing more than an act of sufferance, in that he must 
either allow the dominant owner to do something on the servient land or 
abstain from some action of his own on that land which would otherwise be 
entirely legitimate…’ 157 A compelling argument had been made on behalf of 
the defendants in Regency Villas that these rights could not be easements 
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because of the onus put upon them to maintain the facilities such as the 
swimming pool as well as the need to provide certain chattels such as tennis 
nets. Sir Geoffrey Vos C dismissed such points by arguing that the dominant 
owners could easily bring such chattels as a net for the tennis courts, they 
could also maintain the surface of the courts themselves. In relation to the 
swimming pool he concluded as follows ‘…We accept that a modern swimming 
pool will often have sophisticated filtration, heating, chlorination and water 
circulation system. But such systems are not essential to the benefit and utility 
of using the pool. Water is obviously essential, but that can…be provided by 
the owner of the dominant tenement if the servient owner closes his business 
or allows the pool to fall into disrepair…’158  
CONCLUSION  
                                This is a decision consistent with the view of Lord St Leonard 
in Dyce159 that the categories of easements should not be closed and should 
expand and develop over time. In reviewing the authorities on recreational 
easements there is a sense that the refusal to uphold recreational rights had 
been questioned a number of times by the Judiciary160 and it is therefore 
surprising that the principle has remained for so long. Mounsey v Ismay161 was 
fact specific; the use of land for a horse race by the public was some way from 
a claim over private land by several private landowners. Of course the decision 
in Regency Villas depended on the generous interpretation given to the 
claimant’s rights by Evershed MR in Re Ellenborough Park162 which allowed 
them to walk about and enjoy their neighbour’s land. In reviewing his 
judgment it is not too fanciful to suggest that even then he was conceding that 
the claimants potentially had rights that went beyond merely walking in the 
park.163 He had already seen that walking in your neighbour’s garden could 
include enjoying a game of tennis and bowls. It is surprising that it has taken 
over sixty years for recreational rights to be recognised as legal easements. 
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                 It remains to be seen how the courts will interpret and develop the 
principles enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Regency Villas. Three key areas 
may well prove to be crucial in this. 
                Firstly, how strictly will the terms of the original grant be applied? The 
Court of Appeal was very careful in its construction of the 1981 grant and the 
wording used. Will the construction be limited to facilities already in existence 
or will it be deemed to include extensions or later new facilities? The court 
considered this but left some unanswered questions such as whether 
improvements and upgrading which instituted new facilities would be 
included? Could the rights ever extend beyond those currently enjoyed? An 
example would be if the tennis courts were resurfaced with an all-weather 
surface facilitating other sports such as hockey or netball would they too be 
accepted? 
               Secondly, will recreational and sporting easements be readily accepted 
where the dominant owner is an ordinary landowner as opposed to a 
timeshare owner who has specifically rented property because of the provision 
of the leisure facilities? Judge Purle highlighted in his judgment that in his 
words ‘…the extensive facilities are very obviously a major attraction of the 
timeshare units themselves and would also have been a significant attraction 
for the occupiers of Eltham House had the intended development of the 
Regency Villas never gone ahead…’164 The key question is whether this decision 
would have been the same had the claimants not been owners of timeshare 
properties, where sports facilities were very much at the heart of the property 
being sold. If a claimant had a licence to use a vendor’s swimming pool or 
tennis court and on purchasing the property no mention was made of such 
rights would they now pass under s.62 Law of Property Act 1925 even if use of 
such facilities were not deemed to be at the heart of the purchase? 
                  Finally, how far will the courts allow easements in the future which 
require maintenance of the recreational facility? The discussion about the 
outdoor swimming pool suggested that all that is necessary for a swimming 
pool is water. This cannot be right. A swimming pool is not like an outdoor lake 
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although an analogy was drawn by Sir Geoffrey Vos C;165 it requires constant 
maintenance in order to be enjoyed and the pump, filtration and heating 
would all require some maintenance. Without maintenance, use of the facility 
would rapidly become unusable and a potential health hazard. 
A NOTE OF CAUTION 
                This appears to be a logical and sensible extension to the 
characteristics of re Ellenborough Park and is likely to be welcomed by a wide 
section of the public who enjoy sport and have rights over a neighbour’s land 
for such use. However there is an alternative view to this decision. Should the 
courts be able to grant the status of a legal easement to a whole new category 
of easements constituting recreational rights? A question mark has long lain 
over the breadth of the grant in re Ellenborough Park. If rights are now to be 
extended to the use of facilities such as tennis courts, swimming pools and  
golf courses it can be argued that this is an unjustifiable extension of the 
meaning of ‘utility and benefit’. Undoubtedly sport has become more 
important in people’s lives in the twenty-first century but so has many other 
aspects of life. Once the range of recognised legal easements starts to widen 
then how far can this go? Evershed MR drew a distinction between the right to 
use the park and the right to use the Zoological Gardens free of charge or to 
attend Lord’s Cricket Ground without payment. Evershed MR argued that 
‘....such a right would undoubtedly increase the value of the property 
conveyed but could not run with it at law as an easement, because there was 
no sufficient nexus between the enjoyment of the right and the use of the 
house…’166 One can but speculate whether Evershed MR would have 
considered the right to play croquet on a neighbour’s lawn or the right to play 
squash on his squash court as having sufficient nexus to the use and enjoyment 
of one’s house as a landowner. 
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